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I: INTRODUCTION
The Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA" or "Act")' pro-
vides that the United States may be held liable in tort for
injuries caused by the negligent acts or omissions of gov-
ernment employees.2 This waiver of sovereign immunity
reflects Congress' sentiment that the United States gov-
ernment should be held legally responsible for its negli-
gent conduct.3  This waiver is restricted by the
discretionary function exception to FTCA claims.4 The
, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671, 2680(a)-(n)(1982) [hereinafter "FTCA"]. Sec-
tion 1346(b) provides:
Subject to the provisions of Chapter 171 of this Title, the district
courts, together with the United States District Court for the District
of the Canal Zone and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall
have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the
United States for money damages accruing on and after January 1,
1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of any employee
of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or em-
ployment, under the circumstances where the United States, if a pri-
vate person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the
law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
Id. Section 2671 provides:
As used in this chapter and sections 1346(b) and 2401 (b) of this title,
the term "Federal Agency" includes the executive departments, the
military departments, independent establishments of the United
States, and corporations primarily acting as instrumentalities or
agencies of the United States, but does not include any contractor
with the United States.
Id.
"Employee of the Government" includes officers or employees of
any federal agency, members of the military or naval forces of the
United States, members of the National Guard while engaged in
training or duty under sections 316, 502, 503, 504 or 505 of title 32,
and persons acting on behalf of a federal agency in a official capacity,
temporarily or permanently in the service of the United States,
whether with or without compensation.
Id.
"Acting within the scope of his office or employment", in the case of
a member of the military or naval forces of the United States or a
member of the National Guard as defined in section 101(3) of title
32, means acting in the line of duty.
Id.
I2 Id. § 1346(b).
3 See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 807 (discussing goals and purpose of torts claims act).
4 FTCA § 2680(a). Section 2680(a) states:
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discretionary function exception exempts the United
States from liability for damages arising from the use or
abuse of discretionary government powers.5
Since 1953, federal courts have struggled with the ap-
plication of the discretionary function exception to cases
in which federal government agencies negligently inspect
and "certificate" private industries' compliance with fed-
eral regulation.6 Following the Supreme Court descisions
in Dalehite v. United States7 and Indian Towing v. United
States,8 courts typically imposed liability on the United
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this Title shall
not apply to: Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the government, whether or not
discretion involved be abused.
Id. There are a number of other exceptions to the FTCA including; the loss of
mail by the U.S.; the negligence of government tax or customs officers; admiralty
claims; government acts in administering section 1-31 of title 50; any claim arising
out of a quarantine by the U.S.; claims arising out of false imprisonment, assault
and battery, malicious prosecution, deceit, or interference with contract rights by
Federal law enforcement officers. Id.
Id. See also H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 807 (discussing goals and purpose of torts claims act).
6 49 U.S.C. § 1421(a)(1) (1982). Certification is the process of the government
deciding in a particular case that a person or machine meets standards provided in
the federal regulations. For examples of courts' application of the discretionary
function exception to negligent inspection see, e.g., Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 22 (1953) (discussing claim based on negligent certification of scien-
tific process); Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding
enforcement of safety regulations governing manufacture of explosives nondis-
cretionary); Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061, 1065 (6th Cir. 1981) (find-
ing no liability for negligent certification of aircraft); Lodge v. United States, 662
F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding no discretion to disregard regulations
governing license of polio vaccines), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Ingham v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 238 (2d Cir.) (finding no discretion to disre-
gard air traffic control regulations), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967).
7 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953). In Dalehite, the seminal case on the discretionary func-
tion exception, the Supreme Court held that the United States was not liable for
damages arising out of an explosion because the program leading to the explo-
sion was discretionary and because the negligence occurred at the policy level. Id.
In interpreting the legislative history of the Act and the discretionary function
exception, the Court concluded that Congress intended the discretionary function
exception to cover discretionary acts at the policy making level. Id. at 20-28.
8 350 U.S. 61, 75 (1955). The Court in Indian Towing held the United States
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States only after the negligent acts involved in certifica-
tion passed beyond the policy making stage and into the
policy-implementation stage.9 The Supreme Court dras-
tically narrowed the scope of government liability under
the FTCA in United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio
Grandense (United States v. Varig Airlines)"° and United States
v. Scottish Insurance Co. ,1 the casejoined with Varig.'2 Va rig
liable under the FTCA for the Coast Guard's negligence in operating a lighthouse
because the negligence was operational and did not involve policy making discre-
tion. Id. In Indian Towing, a leading case interpreting the FTCA, the Court clari-
fied Dalehite by emphasizing the planning/operation distinction. Id. at 67-75. The
effect of this distinction was to impose liability on the United States for negligence
in carrying out a decision and protected the United States from suit where its
negligence occurred at the policy making level. Id.
9 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding
U.S. negligence in supervision of flood gates operational); Downs v. United
States, 552 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding United States liable for FBI's
negligent handling of aircraft hijacking and finding negligence operational); Dris-
coil v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding negligent design
of cross walk warning operational); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066
(3d Cir. 1974) (holding U.S. liable for negligent inspection of vaccine); Stork v.
United States, 430 F.2d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding control tower negli-
gence operational); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 784 (2d Cir. 1969)
(holding U.S. liable for negligent licensing of ship officer); United States v.
Furimizo, 381 F.2d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding air traffic controller negli-
gence operational); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 70
(D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (holding U.S. liable for operational air traffic controller
negligence), aff'd sum nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955);
Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530, 545 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (concerning
negligent air safety regulation). See also Tompkins, The Liability of the United States
for Negligent Certification of Aircraft, 17 FORUM 569, 586-89 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Tompkins, Negligent Certification] (noting that courts usually consider the plan-
ning/operation distinction in cases involving discretionary function exception).
lo 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2768 (1984). In Varig, a Boeing 707 burned because a smol-
dering cigarette was not extinguished when placed in a lavatory trash receptacle.
Id. at 2758. The Court found that, under FAA regulations, the fire should have
been contained in the disposal. Id. The Court found that the decision by the FAA
not to inspect the trash receptacle was discretionary. Id. at 2767-68. The Court
reversed the lower court's decision and held that the discretionary function excep-
tion protected the U.S. from liability. Id. at 2769.
" 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2759 (1984). In United Scottish, a small plane caught fire in
mid-air and crashed, killing all of its occupants. Id. at 2759. A faulty heater in the
aircraft caused the crash. Id. The Supreme Court found that the FAA's negli-
gence was discretionary. Id. at 2766. The Court reversed the lower court's deci-
sion and held that the discretionary function exception protected the U.S. from
liability. Id. at 2769.
2. The Supreme Court decided these cases together because both cases con-
cerned claims that the Federal Aviation Administration approved aircraft for
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and United Scottish involved the negligence of the Federal
Aviation Administration ("FAA") in certificating and in-
specting two aircraft.13  In Vang, the court held that the
United States was not liable for 135 deaths and other
damages resulting from the FAA's negligent decision not
to inspect a lavatory disposal unit in a Boeing 707. 1' In
United Scottish, the Court held that the government was not
liable for deaths and damages arising out of the negli-
gence of an FAA inspector in checking the installation of a
modified heater in a DeHavilland Dove aircraft.' 5 In these
joined cases, the Supreme Court extended the discretion-
ary function exception beyond the policy making level and
held that the negligence of FAA inspections was discre-
tionary and was protected by the discretionary function
exception.I6 The Court included the FAA's entire inspec-
tion and certification process in its construction of discre-
tionary acts. 17
This Comment examines the Supreme Court's decision
in Vang and prior decisions of the federal courts to assess
the changes that Vang makes in the law. Part II examines
case law on the FTCA and the discretionary function ex-
ception. Part III reviews the certification and inspection
process. Part IV reviews the facts of Varig and United Scot-
tish. Part V analyzes the Court's reasoning and critiques
flight. Id. at 2757. For the purpose of this discussion, United Scottish will be re-
ferred to implicitly in future cites to Varig alone.
,' 104 S. Ct. at 2755 (1984). In the process of certificating an aircraft, the FAA
inspects portions of the aircraft to ensure compliance of the manufacturer with
federal regulations. See 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1984).
1 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
15 Id.
16 104 S. Ct. at 2755, 2765-68 (deciding that Congress did not intend to subject
regulatory agencies to FTCA liability). See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United
States, 742 F.2d 502, 512 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Varig extended discretion-
ary function exception to entire certification process); Proctor v. United States,
No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 3 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1984) (finding that Varig ex-
tended the discretionary function exception to negligent certification). See gener-
ally, Hatfield, View from Justice: FAA not Liable for Negligent Certification, LPBA
JOURNAL, Sept. 1984, at 4 [hereinafter cited as Hatfield, View from Justice] (arguing
that Varig extended the discretionary function exception to negligent inspection at
the operational level).
,7 104 S. Ct. at 2765-68.
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the weaknesses of the Varig opinion. Finally, Part VI of
the discussion focuses on the broad implications of the
Varig decision.
II: LIABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE FEDERAL
TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. The Legislative History of the Federal Tort Claims Act
Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act (the
"Act") in 1946 after more than twenty-five years of con-
sideration.' 8 The proliferation of private bills to settle
tort claims against the United States led Congress to con-
sider a comprehensive legislative response to such tort
claims.' 9 The legislative history of the Act indicates that
Congress intended to waive sovereign immunity in suits
arising from the tortious acts of United States agents act-
ing within their scope of duty.20 Congress was primarily
8, FTCA §§ 1346(b), 2671, 2680(a)-2680(n). See Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1955) (dis-
cussing history of waivers of sovereign immunity). Congress authorized suit
against the United States prior to 1946. Id. In 1855, Congress established the
Court of Claims and consented to suit against the United States for claims arising
from United States contracts or Federal law. Id. In 1910, Congress consented to
suits against the United States in the Court of Claims for patent infringement. Id.
During World War I, when the government operated the railroads, Congress al-
lowed suit against the United States for property damage, personal injury and
death arising from railroad activities. Id. at 25. In 1925, the government con-
sented to suits against it arising from maritime torts involving government ves-
sels. Id.
,9 See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 807 (discussing policy and goals for FTCA). A private bill is a
piece of legislation introduced on behalf of an individual to redress the individ-
ual's problem. BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1076 (5th ed. 1979) In the 68th Con-
gress, approximately 2,200 private bills were introduced, of which about 250
became law. H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1946 U.S.
CODE & AD. NEWS 807 (discussing need for FTCA). In the 70th Congress, 2,268
private bills were introduced, of which 336 were enacted, with $562 million paid
for tort claims. Id. More recently, in the 77th Congress, 1,829 private bills were
introduced and 593 were approved for a total ofjust over one million dollars. Id.
See also Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception and the Federal Tort Claims Act,
57 GEO. L.J. 81 n.5 (1968) (arguing that private bill system was cumbersome and
unresponsive to needs of claimants).
20 See Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Claims on a General
Tort Bill, 72d Cong. 1st Sess. 17 (1932) (discussing parameters of proposed torts
act). See also Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (concerning allegations
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concerned with ordinary common law torts, 2' but a wide
variety of claims have fallen within the Federal Tort
Claims Act since its inception.2 2 The legislative history of
the Act also indicates that the discretionary function ex-
ception was drafted to protect the government against
tort liability for errors in administration or exercise of dis-
cretionary functions. 23 The exception was drafted to en-
sure that the judiciary would be confined to an
adjudication of facts rather than political or social is-
sues. 24  The legislative history fails to indicate, however,
of government negligence in quartering members of the armed forces in barracks
known to be unsafe). In Feres, the Supreme Court held that the term "agent"
excludes members of the armed forces. Id. at 136-46. Therefore, a member of
the armed forces may not sue the United States under the FTCA for the negli-
gence of another serviceman. Id. For a discussion of the liability of the United
States for negligence of members of the public who are appointed to inspect on
the government's behalf, see Dilk, Negligence of Federal Aviation Administration Dele-
gates Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 J. AIR L. & CoM. 575, 576-600 (1976)
(arguing that Congress did not intend to subject U.S. to liability for negligence of
government delegates).
2 See H. R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 803 (discussing jurisdiction under FTCA); Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 24
(1955) (statement of Assistant Attorney General Francis M. Shea) (referring to
types of negligence actionable under FTCA). See also Downs v. United States, 522
F.2d 990, 995 (10th Cir. 1975) (discussing legislative history of FTCA). Congress
most frequently referred to common law torts in its discussion of the types of
actions to which the bill would apply. Id. Negligent driving was the most com-
mon example of tort liability referred to in these hearings. Id.
22 See Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995-99 (10th Cir. 1975) (discuss-
ing legislative history of FTCA and common application of FTCA in wide variety
of situations). See also, Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 75 (1955)
(holding United States liable for failure to maintain lighthouse); Madison v.
United States, 679 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding enforcement of safety
regulations governing manufacture of explosives nondiscretionary); Underwood
v. United States, 356 F.2d 92, 93-94 (5th Cir. 1966) (holding U.S. liable for negli-
gent decision of government psychiatrist to release patient from hospital).
23 See Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1955) (discussing purpose of FTCA). The discretionary
function exception developed as a means of avoiding any possibility that the
FTCA would be construed to authorize damage suits against the government aris-
ing out of a federal project or expenditure of federal funds, simply because the
similar discretionary conduct by a private individual would be tortious. See also
Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 40 (1953) (interpreting the legislative his-
tory of the discretionary function exception).
21 See H.R. REP. No. 2428, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in 1944 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD NEWS 106 (discussing purpose of discretionary function exception).
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whether the discretionary function exception should be
extended to include the negligence of government em-
ployees that implement discretionary government activi-
ties. 5 This ambiguity in the legislative history has led to
differing interpretations of the scope of the discretionary
function exception.26
B. The Development of the Planning-Operation Distinction
Courts interpreting the discretionary function excep-
tion prior to Varig imposed liability on the United States
under the FTCA for negligence in the implementation of
a program and have not held the United States liable for
negligence in the creation of a program.2 7 These courts
emphasized that there is policy level discretion available
to the individual at the planning stage and that there is no
such discretion at the implementation or "operational"
level.28 This deceptively simple distinction is generally
See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 43 (1953) (discussing legislative
history of FTCA).
25 See Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990, 998 (10th Cir. 1975) (discussing
weaknesses in Congress' deliberations concerning the discretionary function ex-
ception and reviewing cases interpreting the discretionary function exception).
See also Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 5373 and 6463,
77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1955) (explaining in general terms the boundaries of the
discretionary function exception as including "government authorized activity"
such as flood control or irrigation projects where no negligence on part of any
government agent is shown). See also Harrison, Government Liability for Certification
of Aircraft? 44J. AIR L. & CoM. 23, 34 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Harrison, Gov-
emnment Liability] (suggesting that Congress failed to define those functions it con-
sidered discretionary).
2r For discussion, see notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
27 See, e.g., Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 70 (1955) (finding neg-
ligent operation of lighthouse by Coast Guard operational); Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 41 (1953) (finding U.S. not liable for damages arising out of
explosion because progam leading to explosion was discretionary and because
negligence was not at operational level).
28 The idea of a distinction between nonactionable planning and actionable
negligence in carrying out a plan was articulated by the Supreme Court as early as
1886 in Johnston v. District of Columbia, 118 U.S. 19 (1886). In Johnston, the
Court found that the decision of municipal authorities to adopt a general plan of
drainage and to determine where the sewers were to be built was discretionary,
since such a decision involved considerations of public health. Id. at 27. The
negligent physical construction and repair of sewers was held to be actionable. Id.
See also Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 670 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that the
discretionary function exception does not protect United States negligence in air-
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known as the "planning/operation distinction."29
The Court developed the foundation for the plan-
ning/operation distinction in Dalehite v. United States.
30
The Court in Dalehite held that the discretionary function
plane certification); Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973) (applying
discretionary function exception to negligent government decision to test military
aircraft); Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574, 582 (5th Cir. 1971) (holding U.S.
liable for decision of when to test fire Saturn S-IC rocket); Eastern Airlines, Inc. v.
Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (construing air traffic
controller negligence as operational), afd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust
Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); United States v. Gray, 199 F.2d 239, 245 (10th Cir.
1952) (holding United States liable for failure to prevent patient from jumping
out of hospital window); Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631,
640-42 (4th Cir. 1951) (holding that decision to remove or mark wreck which led
to boating accident was discretionary, but no discretion available to negligently
carry out plan to mark waters); Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.
1950) (finding that once decision was made to provide hospital care to a military
dependent there was no discretion left to hospital authorities to treat patient).
29 See, e.g., Downs v. United States, 552 F.2d 990, 996-97 (10th Cir. 1975) (not-
ing that courts typically use planning/operation distinction); United States v.
Washington, 351 F.2d 913, 916 (9th Cir. 1965) (applying planning/operation dis-
tinction to claim for negligent design of power lines leading to aircraft crash);
Whits v. United States, 317 F.2d 13, 17 (4th Cir. 1963) (applying plan-
ning/operation distinction to negligent release of patient from mental hospital);
Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713, 717 (3d Cir.) (applying plan-
ning/operation distinction to claim for negligent highway design), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 923 (1962); United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir. 1962) (ap-
plying planning/ operation distinction to government decision regarding water-
works); Dahlstrom v. United States, 228 F.2d 819, 823 (8th Cir. 1956) (applying
planning/operation distinction to negligence of government pilot); Eastern Air-
lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (applying
planning/operation distinction to negligence of air traffic controller), aFd sub nom.
United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Blessing v. United States,
447 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (applying planning/operation distinction
to negligence of Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
-0 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953) (finding government planning level decision to pro-
duce fertilizer for export discretionary). The Court traced the cause of the explo-
sion to the Cabinet level "FGAN Plan" and pointed out that the negligent acts
leading to the explosion were in accordance with that plan. Id. The Court made it
clear that the decision not to police the shipboard loading of the fertilizer was
made at the policy-forming level, and was not the decision of individual members
of the Coast Guard. Id. The Court implied that the U.S. would have been held
liable had the Coast Guard authorities decided to supervise the storage of the
fertilizer. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 69 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam) (suggesting that if negligence in Dalehite had been at implementation
level Court would have held U.S. liable),aFd sum nom. United States v. Union
Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). The general principle of Dalehite is that the U.S. is
liable for the negligence of its employees at the operational level. Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953).
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exception extends to the "acts of subordinates" in plan-
ning and carrying out high level policy decisions of the
government." The Court characterized "acts of subordi-
nates" as the execution of high level policy decisions
made by executives and administrators in establishing
plans, specifications, or schedules of operation. The
Court described "high level policy decisions" as those
that are made at the planning level and include discretion
in policy judgment.3
Courts have had difficulty in applying the plan-
ning/operation test to negligent certification cases be-
cause the language of the Court's opinion in Dalehite can
, 346 U.S. at 36. The Court relied, in part, on lower court decisions that ap-
plied the discretionary function exception to policy level negligence. Id. See, e.g.,
Coates v. United States, 181 F.2d 816, 822 (8th Cir. 1950) (applying discretionary
function exception to injury of crops and land from negligent government plan
changing course of Mississippi River); Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866,
869 (S.D. Iowa 1950) (applying discretionary function exception to injury from
government blasting done in accordance with plans of chief engineer).
32 346 U.S. at 34. In addition, the Court held that "[w]here there is room for
policy judgment and decision, there is discretion." Id. at 35-36. The breadth of
this language has left open the question of how far the discretion extends, since
discretion can arguably be found in all acts. See also Smith v. United States, 375
F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.) (discussing problem of defining discretion and providing
narrow interpretation of what is discretionary under Dalehite), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
841 (1967); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1174 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(rejecting view of Dalehite that would extend discretionary function exception to
operational acts).
33 346 U.S. at 42. The Court's definition of the planning level in Dalehite was
vague. See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1174 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
(reviewing ambiguities of Dalehite). See infra note 34 for a critical discussion of the
ambiguities in Dalehite. The reference in Dalehite to "high level policy decisions" is
commonly cited to support the argument that Dalehite established that the govern-
ment should be liable at the operational stage and immune under the discretion-
ary function exception at the policy making stage. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 42.
Although the application of this planning/operation test to specific facts has often
proved to be difficult, it is important to note that the test is used only where the
claimant is questioning the implementation of regulations. Id. Where a claimant
challenges the propriety of regulations, the activity becomes immune from liabil-
ity following the characterization of the regulation as "legislative" as in Dalehite.
Id.
In Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978), the district
court suggested that the line between planning and operation is difficult to distin-
guish. Id. at 1173. The court found that most operations retain some planning
elements until final execution. Id. This interpretation suggests that there is a con-
siderable amount of discretion allowed to the judge to determine whether an act
is to be characterized as planning or operational. Id.
be read to suggest a limited construction of the discre-
tionary function exception, even though the specific hold-
ing of the case appears to establish a more expansive view
of the exception. 4 The Court in Dalehite noted that the
policy decisions leading to government's liability were im-
portant to the practicability of the government fertilizer
program.3 5 The Court distinguished between agency de-
cisions critical to the government program and less criti-
cal agency decisions.3 6 This distinction suggests that the
focus of inquiry is on the nature of decision making it-
self.37 Such a focus offers a narrow standard for what the
discretionary function exception would cover. 8 On the
other hand, the Court's finding that the Army's negligent
labeling of fertilizer bags was discretionary indicates a
more expansive view of the discretionary function excep-
tion.3 9 The expansive view of the discretionary function
exception would extend the exception to almost any act of
the government involving judgment.4" The problem in
reconciling the Court's language in Dalehite with its find-
ings is that it is not clear how the considerations going
into the labeling decision were truly critical to the overall
practicability of the government program or why the la-
beling depended on policy considerations. 4' Neverthe-
less, this planning/operation test has been used
consistently in negligence cases that involved the discre-
34 See, e.g. Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574, 575 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting
ambiguities of Dalehite and rejecting expansive view of Dalehite); Smith v. United
States, 375 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir.) (rejecting expansive view of Dalehite and sug-
gesting that such view would limit U.S. liability to auto accident cases), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 841 (1967); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1175 n.23
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that Indian Towing limited Dalehite to narrower view of
discretionary function exception).
- 346 U.S. at 43.
6 Id. See also Blessing v. United States, 447 F.Supp. 1160, 1160-1174 (E.D. Pa.
1978) (discussing ambiguity of Dalehite).
7 Id.
38 Id. at 1174 n.21.
- 346 U.S. at 45-55.
40 Id.
4 Id. See generally Tompkins, Negligent Certification, supra note 9, at 589 (discuss-
ing difficulties courts have had in applying planning/operation distinction).
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tionary function exception.42
The Supreme Court further defined the limits of the
discretionary function exception in Indian Towing v. United
States.43 In Indian Towing, a ship ran aground because the
Coast Guard negligently maintained a lighthouse. 44 The
Court rejected the government's argument that the dis-
cretionary function exception should apply to uniquely
governmental functions. 45 The court found that the sig-
nificant inquiry for application of the discretionary func-
tion exception was whether a private person would be
liable for negligence in similar circumstances. 46  The
Court found that once the United States made a discre-
tionary decision to provide a service, it had to provide the
service with due care.47 Courts applying the rule devel-
42 See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583 F.2d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding
U.S. negligent in supervision of flood gates operational); Downs v. United States,
522 F.2d 990, 997 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding U.S. liable for FBI's negligent han-
dling of aircraft hijacking and finding negligence operational); Driscoll v. United
States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975) (finding negligent design of cross walk
warning operational); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1974)
(holding U.S. liable for negligent inspection of vaccine); Stork v. United States,
430 F.2d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 1970) (finding control tower negligence opera-
tional); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 784 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding U.S.
liable for negligent licensing of ship officer); United States v. Furimizo, 381 F.2d
965, 968 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding air traffic controller negligence operational);
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (per
curiam) (holding U.S. liable for operational air traffic controller negligence), aff'd
sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955); Hoffman v.
United States, 398 F. Supp. 530, 534 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (concerning negligent air
safety regulation).
4 350 U.S. 61, 69 (1955) (finding negligence of Coast Guard lighthouse officer
leading to ship grounding operational and nondiscretionary). The Court empha-
sized its creation of the planning/operation distinction in Dalehite. Id. at 64.
4 Id. at 62.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 69.
41 Id. at 68-69. The Court noted that the public relied on the Coast Guard's
lighthouses and that this reliance created a duty to properly maintain these facili-
ties. Id. The discussion of reliance in Indian Towing may have led to the trend in
litigation against federal agencies toward similar reliance arguments based on
"Good Samaritan" statutes. Under the Good Samaritan doctrine, a court will im-
pose liability on a volunteer rescuer if he takes on the duty of helping a person in
distress and then acts negligently in caring for the person. See BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 624 (5th ed. 1979). See, e.g., Clement v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140,
1145 (1st Cir. 1977) (applying "Good Samaritan" doctrine to claim for FAA negli-
gence); Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1972) (holding
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oped in Indian Towing have characterized the failure of a
federal agency to correctly perform a mandatory act as
operational.4 8 The Court in Indian Towing concluded that
the discretionary function exception did not apply to an
operational activity, even though it stemmed from a dis-
cretionary decision.49
that air traffic controllers' warning about weather was sufficient to meet duty to
warn); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 884 (10th Cir. 1974) (holding govern-
ment liable for failure of air traffic controller to warn pilot of wake turbulence);
Arney v. United States, 479 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that discretion-
ary function exception does not protect negligent FAA inspection); Gill v. United
States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1074 (5th Cir. 1970) (finding government not liable for
supplying inexact and incomplete weather information to pilots). See also RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323, 324(a) (1965) (stating that under "Good
Samaritan" principle once duty is assumed it must be carried out with due care);
Note, Government Inspection and Certification of Private Property, 46 J. AIR L. & COM.
525, 532-34 (1980) (discussing "Good Samaritan" doctrine and FTCA litigation).
48 See, e.g., Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding
negligent inspection of clay mine and failure to enforce mandatory safety stan-
dards not protected by discretionary function exception); Madison v. United
States, 679 F.2d 736, 741 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding enforcement of safety regula-
tions governing manufacture of ammunition not within discretionary function ex-
ception); Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding no
discretion to disregard mandatory regulatory commands governing license of po-
lio vaccine), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982); Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d
1140, 1145 (1st Cir. 1974) (applying "Good Samaritan" doctrine against U.S. for
negligent acts of air traffic controllers); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059,
1068-69 (3d Cir. 1974) (finding failure to follow mandatory regulations regarding
polio vaccine program non-discretionary); Yates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878,
884 (10th Cir. 1974) (imposing liability on United States for air traffic controllers'
failure to warn of wake turbulence); Ingham v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 373 F.2d
227, 238 (2d Cir. 1967) (finding no discretion to disregard air traffic control regu-
lations), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931 (1967); United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379,
394-95 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding no discretion to violate regulations concerning
segregation of air traffic), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964); Hoffman v. United
States, 398 F. Supp. 530, 533-38 (E.D. Mich. 1975), aff'd, 600 F.2d 590 (6th Cir.
1979) (finding no discretion for FAA to ignore federal regulations), cert.denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980); Rapp v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 673, 681 (E.D. Pa.
1967) (finding that the discretionary function exception does not protect FAA's
negligent failure to revise standards for faulty engine), vacated by agreement, 521
F.2d 1399 (3d Cir. 1970); Cf Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 180-82
(1956) (concerning failure to follow livestock grazing regulation).
49 350 U.S. at 64, 69. The government conceded that the actual operation of
the lighthouse did not involve discretion or the discretionary function exception.
Id. at 64. The government argued that the language of the FTCA imposing liabil-
ity "in the same manner and to the same extent as private individuals under like
circumstances" should be read to exclude from liability activities that private per-
sons do not perform. Id. The Court rejected this argument as spurious, finding
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The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit further clarified the planning/operation
test in Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co. 51 In Eastern
Airlines, the negligence of air traffic controllers led to a
mid-air collision between two aircrafts.51 The court fo-
cused on the process of decision making and the rank of
the employees involved to assess the nature of the gov-
ernment's discretion.5 2 The court found that, although
some individual discretion was involved in the air traffic
controllers' handling of the two aircraft, it was not at the
policy making level and, therefore, did not fall within the
discretionary function exception.53 The court compared
the negligence of the tower operators to that of a negli-
gent government driver and concluded that both exer-
cised discretion, but not the type of policy making
discretion contemplated by the discretionary function ex-
ception.54 The court found that the air traffic controllers'
negligence did not fall within the discretionary function
exception and held the government liable under the
FTCA. 55 The Court of Appeals stated that under its test,
the government in Dalehite would have been liable under
the Act had that accident occurred as a result of the negli-
gent operation of the loading plan rather than as the re-
sult of a negligent decision in the planning stage.56
In Hendry v. United States57 the Second Circuit added sev-
that the distinction was difficult to make and had no support in the legislative
history. Id. at 67-68.
5o 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per curiam) (holding government liable for
negligence leading to mid-air collision), afd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust
Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
31 Id. at 76-78.
52 Id. at 76-77. The D.C. Circuit noted that in Dalehite the Supreme Court care-
fully established that each alleged act of negligence resulted directly from the
Cabinet plan for the production of the chemical. Id. Based on this, the court in
Eastern Airlines found that discretion was exercised when the government decided
to operate the tower, but tower personnel had no discretion to operate it negli-
gently. Id. at 77.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 78.
Id. at 64-66.
56 Id. at 77.
57 418 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding U.S. liable for negligent withholding of
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eral factors to the Eastern Airlines analysis for distinguish-
ing decisions made at the planning level from those made
at the operational level.5 8 These factors included whether
the decision required a balancing test without reliance on
ascertainable standards, whether the decision involved
the adoption of general principles or merely their applica-
tion, and the level at which the decision was made. 59 The
court suggested that guidance may be offered as to
whether discretion exists by looking closely at the statute
and its descriptions of the duties and functions of the
agency and its agents.60 The court also focused on
whether the claimant attacked the premise of a rule or the
way in which it was implemented.6 ' In addition, the court
considered whether the claimant's attack raised political
issues, which would be nonjusticiable. 62 The court in Hen-
dry, relying on Dalehite, articulated the general principle
that the discretionary function exception applies when a
claimant attacks the nature of federal rules but does not
apply when the claimant challenges the application of
those rules.63
officer's license by Coast Guard officials based on negligent determination by
public heath service psychiatrists that officer was unfit for duty). The court in
Hendry found that doctors did not have the statutory authority to withhold licenses
for public safety reasons and have the limited discretion of a physician in private
practice. Id. See also White v. United States, 317 F.2d 17, 26 (4th.Cir. 1963) (find-
ing discretionary function exception does not protect negligent decision to allow
psychiatric patient freedom of movement resulting in suicide); Friedland v. United
States, 209 F. Supp. 684, 685 (D. Mass. 1962) (holding that discretionary function
exception does not protect decision to release patient from psychiatric institution
where Veterans Administration regulations did not provide discretion to negli-
gently allow freedom to patients); Ruffino v. United States, 126 F. Supp. 132, 135
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (holding that discretionary function exception does not shield
negligent administration of insulin).
5 418 F.2d at 782-83.
-I5 Id. According to these standards, courts would view a professional expert
evaluation as nondiscretionary and a government decision involving the balancing
of cost, purpose, and feasibility as discretionary. Id.
w Id.
61 Id. at 782.
62 Id.
(m Id. at 782-83. See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 40, 42 (1953)
(establishing foundation for standards to assess whether to allow discretionary
function exception as defense to government negligence); Blessing v. United
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This series of cases indicates that the decisions of fed-
eral agencies regarding inspection methods should be
viewed as discretionary and, therefore, protected by the
discretionary function exception. 64 These cases also sug-
gest that the United States should be held liable for negli-
gent inspection once the inspection policy has been
established. 65 The FTCA litigation prior to Varig estab-
lished the planning/operation distinction as the determi-
native test for application of the discretionary function
exception.66
III: FAA INSPECTION AND CERTIFICATION
The Court in Vang closely analyzed the inspection and
States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (finding that nature of act and not
status of actor governs planning/operational analysis).
See Indian Towing & Co, v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64-66 (1955) (clarify-
ing Dalehite); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 36-42 (1953) (interpreting the
discretionary function exception); Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 782-83
(2d Cir. 1969) (developing factors to distinguish planning level from policy level);
Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75-78 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (per
curiam) (adding specific standards to planning/operational distinction), aff'd sub
nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
w5 See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 75-79 (D.C. Cir.
1955) (per curiam) (applying planning/operation distinction to negligence of air
traffic controller), aff'd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907
(1955).
66 See Tompkins, Negligent Certification, supra note 9, at 594 (arguing that plan-
ning/operation distinction is the standard mode of analysis in FTCA actions in-
volving the discretionary function exception). See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 583
F.2d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1978) (finding United States negligence in supervision of
flood gates operational); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir.
1975) (finding negligent design of crosswalk warning operational); Downs v.
United States, 522 F.2d 990, 995 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding United States liable for
FBI's negligent handling of aircraft hijacking and finding negligence operational);
Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1066 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding U.S. liable
for negligent inspection of vaccine); Stork v. United States, 430 F.2d 1104, 1107
(9th Cir. 1970) (finding control tower negligence operational); Hendry v. United
States, 418 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1969) (holding United States liable for negli-
gent licensing of ship officer); United States v. Furumizo, 381 F.2d 965, 968 (9th
Cir. 1967) (finding air traffic controller negligence operational); Eastern Airlines,
Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 70 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (holding United States
liable for operational air traffic controller negligence), aff'd sub nom. United States
v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per curiam); Hoffman v. United States,
398 F. Supp. 530, 535 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (concerning negligent air safety
regulation).
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certification process. 6 7 As a result, it is essential to under-
stand the FAA's inspection and certification process prior
to examining the Court's decision in Varig.68 The Federal
Aviation Act of 195869 directs the Secretary of Transpor-
tation to promote flight safety by establishing minimum
standards governing the designs, materials, construction,
and performance of aircraft. v Congress has also granted
the Secretary the discretion to prescribe regulations gov-
erning the inspection of aircraft, including the manner in
which such inspections should be made.7 ' Consistent
with those duties and powers, the Administrator of the
FAA issues certificates for aircraft and component parts
and requires the manufacturers and modifiers of aircraft
to fulfill certification requirements prior to issuing a
certificate.72
To accomplish these goals, the Administrator estab-
lished a multistep certification process to monitor the avi-
67 104 S. Ct. at 2765-68 (finding supplemental type certification process and
type certification process highly similar). See also Petition for Rehearing at 2,
United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984) (contending that Court mis-
construed certification process in United Scottish).
- See Dombroff, Certification and Inspection: An Overview of Government Liability, 47
J. AIR L. & COM. 229, 237 (1982) (discussing certification and inspection process)
[hereinafter cited as Dombroff, Certification and Inspection] .
69 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1958 Act]. The Federal Aviation Agency was renamed the Federal
Aviation Administration and placed under the Department of Transportation pur-
suant to the Department of Transportation Act, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 48, 80 Stat.
931, 932 (1966) (current version of 49 U.S.C. § 1655 (1982)). When the type
certificate for the Boeing 707 owned by Varig was issued, the Civil Aeronautics
Act of 1938 was the governing statute. See Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Ch. 601,
52 Stat. 973 (1938). The Supreme Court, for convenience, referred to the 1958
Federal Aviation Act because the relevant provisions of the 1958 Act are virtually
identical to those of its predecessor. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2760.
70 1958 Act § 1421(a)(1) provides:
The Secretary of Transportation is empowered and it shall be his
duty to promote safety of flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing and revising from time to time: (1) Such minimum stan-
dards governing the design, materials, workmanship, construction,
and performance of aircraft, aircraft engines and propellers as may
be required in the interest of safety.
Id.
71 1958 Act § 1421(a)(3).
72 Id. § 1423. The Administrator is the chief officer of the FAA. Id.
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ation industry's compliance with the requirements
promulgated by the Secretary of Transportation." The
FAA, acting as the Secretary's designee, has developed a
comprehensive set of regulations delineating the mini-
mum safety standards that designers and manufacturers
must comply with before marketing their aircraft. 4 The
FAA evaluates the basic design of an aircraft in "type cer-
tification," the first stage of the FAA compliance review.7 5
To evaluate the plans, FAA employees or designated em-
ployees of the manufacturer review data submitted by the
applicant and make spot checks to assess compliance with
the regulations. 76 The manufacturer's record of compli-
ance determines the extent of the FAA's inspection. 77 If
the FAA finds that the proposed aircraft design meets the
minimum safety standards, it issues a type certificate.78
Once the type certificate is issued and a prototype is pro-
duced that meets FAA standards, the FAA issues a "pro-
duction certificate," which authorizes the manufacturer to
produce duplicate aircraft.7 9
73 See 14 C.F.R. pts. 23, 25, 27, 29, 31, 33, and 35 (1985) (delineating the certifi-
cation process).
74 Id. See generally Krause & Cook, The Liability of the United States for Negligent
Inspection, 48 J. AIR L. & COM. 725, 730-34 (1983) (discussing certification
process).
75 14 C.F.R. § 21.15 (1985). "Type certificate" specifies the make and the basic
model of an aircraft, the operating limitations, the applicable regulations with
which the FAA records compliance, and any other conditions prescribed for the
aircraft. Id. §§ 21.21-21.41.
76 1958 Act § 1355 (1982). This provision authorizes the Secretary to delegate
certain inspection and certification responsibilities to qualified private persons.
See 14 C.F.R. § 183.29 (1985). These representatives are typically employees of
aircraft manufacturers who possess detailed knowledge of an aircraft's design.
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITrEE ON FAA AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICA-
TION PROCEDURES, IMPROVING AIRCRAFT SAFETY 29 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
IMPROVING AIRCRAFr SAFETY]. The representatives act as surrogates of the FAA in
examining, inspecting, and testing aircraft in the certification process. See 14
C.F.R. § 183.1 (1984).
77 See FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, FAA ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION 31-
32 (reprint 1967) (discussing spot check criteria).
78 14 C.F.R. § 21.21 (1985). One major manufacturer of commercial aircraft
estimates that in the course of obtaining a type certificate, an aircraft manufac-
turer will submit approximately three hundred thousand drawings and changes to
the FAA. See IMPROVING AIRCRAFT SAFETY, supra note 76, at 29-30.
7s 49 U.S.C. § 1423(b) (1982). To obtain a production certificate, the manu-
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Prior to placing an aircraft in service, the owner of the
aircraft must obtain an "airworthiness certificate," which
indicates that the aircraft conforms to the type certificate
and is in good condition. 80 A "supplemental type certifi-
cate" must be obtained if a major modification or substan-
tial change is contemplated in an aircraft. 8 t A review of
plans for proposed modifications and a complete con-
formance inspection following the performance of the
work involved determines the approval of a supplemental
type certificate.8 2 For certain types of modifications, such
as the installation of a new heater unit, the FAA is re-
quired to physically inspect the alteration. 83
IV. FACTUAL SETrING
A. United States v. Varig Airlines
On July 11, 1973, a fire developed in the aft lavatory of
a commercial jet owned by Varig Airlines that was enroute
from Rio de Janeiro to Paris.84 Although the crew man-
aged to land the jet, 124 of the 135 persons on board died
from asphyxiation or the effects of toxic gases produced
by the fire.85 In addition, as a result of the fire, most of
facturer must prove to the FAA that it has established and can maintain a quality
control system to assure that each aircraft will meet the design provisions of the
type certificate. 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.139 - 21.143 (1985).
8o 49 U.S.C. § 1423(c) (1982). It is unlawful for any person to operate an air-
craft in air commerce without a valid airworthiness certificate. Id. § 1430(a)(1)
(1982).
81 14 C.F.R. § 21.113 (1985). An example of a modification requiring a supple-
mental type certification was the reconstruction of the gasoline heater unit in the
United Scottish case. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, No. CU 71-36 E, slip
op. at 2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1980), aff'd, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984).
82 14 C.F.R. § 21.115 (1985). See also Petition for Rehearing at 3-4, United
States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984) (arguing that inspection of heater
was mandatory); United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, No. CV 71-36 E, slip
op. at 25 (S.D.Cal. Feb. 24, 1980), affd, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd,
United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984).
" 14 C.F.R. § 21.115-.117 (1985). See also FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
FAA ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION 31, 39 (reprint 1967).
14 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2758. Varig Airlines is a commercial Brazilian air carrier.
Id. at 2758.
" 104 S. Ct. at 2758.
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the aircraft was destroyed.8 6 The aircraft involved was a
Boeing 707 jet.87 Seabord Airlines purchased the jet from
Boeing in 1958 and sold it in 1969 to Varig Airlines,
which used the jet commercially until 1973.88 The Civil
Aeronautics Agency (CAA), the predecessor to the FAA,
issued a type certificate for the Boeing 707 in 1958, certi-
fying that the jet's designs and performance data con-
formed with minimum safety standards.8 9
Varig Airlines and the families of the passengers killed
in the crash brought suit against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages and wrongful
death.90 The plaintiffs asserted that the CAA had been
negligent in inspecting the Boeing 707 and in issuing a
type certificate to a class of aircraft that did not meet CAA
fire protection standards. 9 1 The district court, applying
the law of California, 92 granted summary judgment for the
United States on the ground that California law does not
recognize a duty actionable in tort for inspection and cer-
tification.9 3 The district court also found that, even if the
plaintiffs had presented an action in tort, recovery was
barred by two exceptions to the FTCA: the discretionary
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 2758.
89 Id. See supra note 75 for a review of type certification.
I ld. Because the accident occurred in France, the official accident investiga-
tion came under the jurisdiction of a French Commission of Inquiry, which
worked in conjunction with a National Transportation Safety Board investigator.
Brief for Varig Airlines in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2,
Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
9, 104 S. Ct. at 2758 (1984). The plaintiffs in Varig asserted that the fire
originated in the towel disposal area, located below the sink unit in one of the
lavatories, and alleged that the towel disposal area was incapable of containing
fire. Id. The plaintiffs emphasized air safety regulations requiring that waste re-
ceptacles be made of fire-resistant materials and incorporate other mechanisms
for containing possible fires. Id. See also 14 C.F.R. § 4b.381(d) (1984) (discussing
requirements for installation of waste receptacles).
92 The FTCA requires that courts apply the substantive tort law of the jurisdic-
tion in assessing the relative liabilities of the parties involved in an accident.
91 Varig Airlines v. United States, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,577, 17,586-89 (C.D.
Cal. May 12, 1981) (noting that under FTCA plaintiff must raise claim that is valid
under law of state of claim), afd, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, United
States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984).
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function exception94 and the misrepresentation excep-
tion.9 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed the district court.96 The Ninth Circuit de-
cided that a private person inspecting and certificating for
airworthiness would be liable under the California "Good
Samaritan" rule and concluded that the United States
should be judged by the same standard.97 The Court of
Appeals rejected the government's argument that the
plaintiffs' actions were barred by the misrepresentation
exception.9 8 In addition, the court rejected the discre-
FTCA § 2680(a) (1982). Section 2680 (a) states as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this Title shall
not apply to: Any claim based upon an act or omission of an em-
ployee of the government, exercising due care, in the execution of a
statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be
valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to
exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not
such discretion involved be abused.
Id.
The misrepresentation exception provides that the United States is not sub-
ject to liability for any claim arising out of a misrepresentation in a certificate. Id.
§ 2680(h) (stating that provisions of FTCA shall not apply to any claims arising
out of a misrepresentation). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311
(1977) (defining tort of negligent misrepresentation as negligently giving false
information to another leading to reliance on information resulting in harm). In
Varig, the Court decided not to consider the misrepresentation exception. Varig
Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2766.
- Varig Airlines v. United States, 692 F.2d 1205, 1209 (9th Cir. 1982) (finding
U.S. liable for negligence in certificating Boeing 707), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 2755
(1984).
97 Id. at 1212-20. The court found that aircraft purchasers rely on the FAA's
certification process in purchasing aircraft, and passengers rely on that process for
flight safety. Id. at 1208. Although members of the flying public may not know
the specific contents of the FAA regulations, they are aware, in general, that safety
regulations exist and that the United States checks aircraft for compliance. Id.
The United States should expect that members of the public will rely on proper
performance by the FAA of its duty to inspect and certificate. Id.
18 Id. at 1215. The court interpreted the plaintiffs claims as arising from negli-
gence and not misrepresentation. Id. The Supreme Court's decision not to con-
sider the misrepresentation defense may reflect the fact that courts have not
entertained the defense when the claim primarily sounds in negligence. See, e.g.,
Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 825, 835 (D. Utah 1971) (finding faulty
design of aeronautical chart a negligent act not misrepresentation). See also Neal
v. Bergland, 646 F.2d 1178, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding misrepresentation
exception inapplicable to negligent certification of home); Ware v. United States,
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tionary function exception defense and found that there
was no discretion available to the FAA inspector to ignore
safety violations. 99 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Vang'00 to determine whether the United States could
be held liable under the FTCA for the FAA's negligent
certification of aircraft.' 0 '
B. United States v. United Scottish Insurance Co.
A review of the facts of United Scottish,'0 2 the case joined
with Varig,10 3 is crucial in order to understand and ana-
lyze the difference between Vanig and United Scottish. In
Varig, the FAA decided not to inspect the aircraft lava-
tory. 10 4 In United Scottish, however, the FAA actually in-
spected the aircraft's heater.10 5 The Supreme Court may
have extended the discretionary function exception to
negligent inspection because it did not discuss these
differences. 10 6
In United Scottish, a DeHavilland Dove aircraft used in
the operation of an air taxi service caught fire in midair,
626 F.2d 1278, 1283 (5th Cir. 1980) (finding misrepresentation exception not a
bar to claim arising from misdiagnosis of illness in cattle); In re Air Crash Disaster
near Silver Plume, Colo., 445 F. Supp. 384, 409 (D. Kan. 1977) (holding misrep-
resentation exception not bar to action for negligent certification of airplane). See
generally Iser, Government Liability for Negligent Airworthiness Certification, 31 HASTINGS
L. J. 247, 268 (1979) (discussing misrepresentation exception and noting that it
has not been successful defense to claims of government negligence).
- 692 F.2d at 1208-09. The Ninth Circuit, citing Dalehite, construed the discre-
tionary function exception as primarily precluding suits arising from decisions of
administrators or executives. Id. The court concluded that the duties undertaken
by the FAA inspectors are more like those of the lighthouse keepers in Indian
Towing than those of the Cabinet-level Secretaries in Dalehite. Id. at 1209.
,oo 461 U.S. 925 (1984).
101 Id.
102 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
10- United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, No. CV 71-36 E, slip op. at 2 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 1980), affid, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, United States v.
Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755 (1984).
-04 Varig, 16 Av. Case (CCH) at 17,585-87.
105 No. CV 71-36 E, slip op. at 6. See also Petition for Rehearing at 2, United
States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
,0 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2766 (finding that Congress did not intend to permit U.S.
liability for inspection and certification by regulatory agencies). See also Hatfield,
View from Justice, supra note 17, at 5 (arguing that Supreme Court extended discre-
tionary function exception to negligent certification in Varig).
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crashed and burned near Las Vegas, Nevada. 0 7 The pi-
lot, copilot, and two passengers were killed. 0 8 The cause
of the crash was an in-flight fire in the forward baggage
compartment of the aircraft.' 0 9 Air Wisconsin purchased
the DeHavilland Dove in 195 1. 10 In 1965, Aerodyne En-
gineering Corporation installed a gasoline cabin heater in
the airplane.' The FAA inspected the installation and
granted Air Wisconsin a supplemental type certificate. ' 2
In 1966, Dowdle, an air taxi operator, purchased the
DeHavilland Dove from Air Wisconsin." 3  Dowdle's in-
surance company, United Scottish, brought an action for
wrongful death and property damage after the aircraft
crashed." 4 The district court found that the crash re-
sulted from defects in the installation of the gasoline lines
to the cabin heater and concluded that the installation did
not comply with FAA regulations." 5 The court held the
government liable for the FAA's negligence in certifying
an installation that did not comply with safety
regulations." 1 6
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case to
the district court to consider whether California's Good
Samaritan law would impose a duty on the government to
107 United Scottish Ins. Co., CV 71-36E, slip op. at 2. A DeHavilland Dove is a
twin engine propeller airplane seating eight to ten passengers and two crew mem-
bers. Id.
io. Id.
log Id. The fire was caused by a faulty fuel line leading to the gasoline heater.
Id. at 7.
I d. at 3.
'it Id. Aerodyne also installed defective gasoline lines and defective couplings,
resulting in the explosion. Id.
1' Id. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (reviewing district courts find-
ing that heater was inspected).
United Scottish Ins. Co., CV 71-36E, slip op. at 20.
Id. at 15. The plantiffs alleged that the FAA negligently inspected the heater
installation. Id.
11-1 Id. at 23. The court found that the installation did not comply with FAA
regulations that specify the amount of vibration that an installation must with-
stand. Id.
1"- Id. at 9. The district court cited the FAA's negligence as the proximate cause
of the accident. Id.
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properly inspect.'1 7 The court of appeals also asked the
district court to determine whether a negligently issued
certificate constituted a breach of the FAA's duty to prop-
erly inspect." 8 On remand, the district court found for
the plaintiffs, ruling that the California Good Samaritan
rule established liability under these facts. 1 9 The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding
that careful performance of aircraft inspections is the es-
sence of the government's duty once the inspections are
undertaken.' 20
Varig and United Scottish were not based on similar
claims. 121 The crucial difference between the two cases is
that Varig involved a decision not to inspect, 122 whereas
United Scottish involved a mandatory inspection that was
negligently implemented at the operational level.' 23 The
11 United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, 614 F.2d 188, 198-99 (9th Cir.
1979), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
i Id.
1' United Scottish Ins. Co., CV 71-36E, slip op. at 21. See, e.g., Coffee v. McDon-
nell-Douglas Corp., 503 P.2d 1366 (Cal. 1972) (holding employer liable for dam-
ages resulting from failure to discover disease in the course of pre-employment
physical examination); Schwartz v. Helms Bakery, 430 P.2d 68 ( Cal. 1968) (find-
ing defendant actionable based on Good Samaritan principle).
120 Varig, 692 F.2d at 1212. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that FAA officials en-
force the FAA's requirements by inspecting aircraft, but cannot in any way change
or waive safety requirements. Id. at 1209. The court found that inspection, a
discretionary function, was not performed. Id.
"' See Petition for Rehearing at 2-3, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct.
2755 (1984) (arguing that United Scottish involved negligent inspection while Varig
involved negligent decision not to inspect).
'22 Varig Airlines, 16 Av. Case (CCH) at 17,582.
"2 United Scottish Ins. Co., CV 71-36E, slip op. at 25 (finding inspection of heater
was mandatory and was actually carried out by FAA). The district court noted
that:
The Federal Aviation Administration and the Federal Aviation Reg-
ulations require the aircraft herein to be inspected by the Federal
Aviation Administraion personnel after the installation of the heater
in 1965 to determine its airworthiness as modified . ..Federal Avi-
ation Administration regulations in effect in 1965 required that a
Federal Aviation Administration inspector, or a designated General
Aviation District Office Inspector (also an FAA employee) physically
inspect the combustion heater installation prior to the approval of
the supplemental type certificate or its revision before the supple-
mental type certificate could be approved.
Court held that the discretionary function exception
barred the Government from liability for its negligence in
both Varig and United Scottish. 124 The United States, in its
brief on first appeal to the Ninth Circuit, admitted that the
inspection was mandatory. The brief stated: "Due to the
nature of the installation, the [FAA's] regulations re-
quired that a supplemental type certificate -be obtained
from the FAA to cover the heater and an FAA inspection
was required prior to the issuance of the supplemental
type certificate.' 25 The Ninth Circuit noted that "FAA
regulations, 14 C.F.R. Part 21.E required that Aerodyne
[the operator of the aircraft] acquire a Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC) from the FAA for this type of installa-
tion. The parties agree that FAA regulations also re-
quired that the FAA inspect the installation prior to giving
its approval for issuance of the (STC).' 26  The Court
hald that the discretionary function exception protected
the goverment from hability in both Varig and United
Scottish. 127
V: THE VARIG DECISION
A. Review of the Supreme Court Opinion: The
Regulatory/Nonregulatory Distinction
In Varig, the Supreme Court held that the discretionary
function exception extended to all negligent acts of the
FAA in inspecting and certifying aircraft. ' 28 The rationale
124 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2755.
"25 Brief for the United States at 5, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States,
614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.
Ct. 2755 (1984).
"1 Id. at 190.
127 Id.
128 104 S. Ct. at 2764-69 (1984) (finding that Congress intended to extend dis-
cretionary function exception to negligence of federal agencies). See also Natural
Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 502, 509 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
Varig extended inspection); Proctor v. United States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at
3, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1984) (finding Varig extended discretionary function excep-
tion to operational negligence). For an argument against holding the U.S. liable
for negligent certification, see Hatfield, The Non-Liability of the Government for Certifi-
cation of Aircraft, 17 FORUM 602, 607 (1982) (arguing that allowing recovery for
negligent certification would make U.S. an insurer of air travel). But see Tompkins,
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for this decision was that Congress did not intend to per-
mit actions against the United States for negligent en-
forcement of private industries' compliance with federal
regulations. 129 The Court also found that holding the
United States liable in Varig would make the United States
an insurer of air transportation. 30
The Court interpreted its previous decision in Dalehite
to extend the discretionary function exception to opera-
tional acts. 13  Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court,
limited his discussion of Dalehite to a quote from the opin-
ion that suggested that the discretionary function excep-
tion extends beyond the acts of top administrators. 32
Chief Justice Burger summarily concluded that after
Dalehite, it is unnecessary to define the precise contours of
the discretionary function exception. 33 Instead, courts
should review the legislative history of the FTCA to infer
whether Congress intended to cover the category of fed-
eral acts involved in a particular case. 3 4  The Court, in
effect, created a regulatory/nonregulatory distinction that
applies the discretionary function exception to the negli-
gent operational acts of regulatory agencies. 35
Negligent Certification, supra note 9 at 570-71 (arguing that U.S. should be liable for
negligent certification because of high level of public reliance on FAA for protect-
ing safety).
,2 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2763-69. The Court implied that holding the U.S. liable
for negligent inspection would be inconsistent with the distribution of duties be-
tween the FAA and aircraft manufacturers. Id. The Court emphasized that the
manufacturer is primarily responsible for complying with federal regulation and
found that the FAA merely polices compliance. Id.
, ' Id. at 2769.
'" Id. at 2763-65 (finding that Dalehite stood for principle that discretionary
function exception extends to all employees exercising discretion).
'3 Id. at 2765. The Court quoted the section from Dalehite stating that "acts of
subordinates in carrying out operations of government in accordance with official
direction cannot be actionable." Id. (quoting Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S.
15, 33 (1953)).
,ss Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765 (1984). This conclusion from Dalehite is arguably
dicta in light of the fact that the Court in Dalehite found that thE discretionary
function exception protects the "acts of administrators." Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953).
4 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2762-64 (1984).
, Id. at 2764-65 (emphasizing finding that Congress did not intend for regula-
tory agencies to be held liable under FTCA). See also Seagram and Sons, Inc. v.
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In addition to adopting the broad view of Dalehite, the
Court dismissed the planning/operation distinction by re-
jecting Indian Towing as irrelevant. 36 The Court empha-
sized the fact that the discretionary function exception
was not relied on in Indian Towing as a defense to the alle-
gation of government negligence. 37 In rejecting this pre-
cedent, the Court also dismissed the significant Indian
Towing principle that once the United States assumes a
duty, it will be held liable for negligence in carrying out
that duty. 138 The Court de-emphasized Eastern Airlines as
well, because the court in Eastern Airlines relied on Indian
Towing.'39 The Court, through its rejection of Eastern Air-
lines, indicated its dissatisfaction with the cases that devel-
oped the planning/operation distinction. 40
The Supreme Court articulated three broad principles
from its review of the legislative history and relevant
United States, No. 82-900-C, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 9, 1985) (citing Untied
States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. at 2764); General Public Utilities Corp. v.
United States, 745 F.2d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1984).
136 Id. at 2764.
7 Id. at 2764. Although the United States did not rely on the discretionary
function exception in Indian Towing, the issues discussed in relation to the govern-
ment's claim in that case bear directly on the discretionary function exception.
Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68 (1955). The government in In-
dian Towing argued that the FTCA contained an implied exception from liability
for "uniquely government functions." Id. In Varig, the Supreme Court noted that
the Indian Towing decision rejected the government's "unique government func-
tion" assertion, reasoning that it would require courts to consider a governmen-
tal and nongovernmental distinction, which is difficult to ascertain. 104 S. Ct. at
2764 (1984). That holding could require the courts to determine in each case,
whether the activity is found in the private sector or is uniquely a government
function. Id.
'-, 104 S. Ct. at 2764. See Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 69
(1955) (developing principle that once U.S. assumes duty it must implement duty
without negligence).
-9 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2764-65 (1984). Although the court in Eastern Airlines relied
on Indian Towing, it articulated standards for the planning/operation distinction.
See supra note 48b (discussing standards for planning/operation distinction).
,40 See generally Petition for Rehearing at 2, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104
S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (contending that Supreme Court neglected planning/operation
distinction). The Court also rejected the plantiffis reliance on Rayonier v. United
States as equally misplaced. Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2756-65. See Rayonier v. United
States, 352 U.S. 315, 320 (1957) (finding U.S. liable for negligence in controlling
fire).
224 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [51
cases.' 4 ' First, "the nature of the conduct, rather than the
status of the actor, governs whether the discretionary
function exception applies in a given case. "142 Second,
"the basic inquiry concerning the application of the dis-
cretionary function exception is whether the challenged
acts of a Government employee . . . are of the nature
and quality that Congress intended to shield from tort lia-
bility." 143 Third, the discretionary function exception en-
compasses all discretionary acts of government when it
regulates the conduct of private individuals.144 Based on
these conclusions, the Court considered whether the dis-
cretionary function exception immunized the FAA from
tort liability for the inspection and certification involved
in Varig.' 45
The Court in Varig focused exclusively on the issue of
negligent certification and concluded that neither the
Boeing 707 nor the DeHavilland Dove cabin heater was
actually inspected. 46  These cases, the Court decided,
were based on alleged negligence in the failure of the
FAA to inspect these aircraft in the process of certifica-
tion. 147 The Court, as a result, did not address issues re-
14, Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765.
142 Id. The Court relied on D&lehite for this principle. See Dalehite v. United
States, 346 U.S. 15, 33 (1953).
143 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765 (emphasizing Congress' intent to focus on acts).
144 Id. But see Hearings on H.R. 5373 and H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 28-33 (1942) (statement of Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Francis M. Shea) (noting that discretionary function exception should not
protect ordinary torts committed by regulatory agencies).
145 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765 (1984).
146 Id. at 2765-66. The Court stated that this conclusion reflected the district
court's finding. Id. The district court, however, found the opposite. United Scot-
tish Ins. Co. v. United States, No. CV 71-36E, slip op. at 7 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1980)
(finding that FAA inspected heater in DeHavilland Dove), afd, 692 F.2d 1209
(9th Cir. 1982), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755
(1984).
,47 104 S. Ct. at 2765. Although the Court focused on negligence at the plan-
ning level, its language and holding indicated that it addressed operational negli-
gence. See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 502, 504 (9th
Cir. 1984) (holding that Varig extends discretionary function exception to negli-
gent inspection); Proctor v. United States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 3, (C.D.
Cal. Aug. 22, 1984) (finding Varig extended discretionary function exception to
operational negligence).
lating to an actual inspection that was negligently
performed.
Chief Justice Burger reviewed the spot check system,
used by the FAA to decide on those parts of an aircraft to
inspect during certification. 4 8 The Court found that deci-
sions concerning what to inspect were based on a variety
of factors, such as the manufacturer's compliance record
and its experience in production. 4 ' The spot check sys-
tem, the Court concluded, was within the protection of
the discretionary function exception. 150 The Court, in
making this decision, found that decisions of the engi-
neers and inspectors regarding the extent of inspection
involved statutorily granted discretion.' 15  Based on these
conclusions, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit and held that the actions against the FAA for its negli-
gence in certifying aircraft were barred by the
discretionary function exception.15
The United Scottish Insurance Company ("USIC") ar-
gued that it was unclear whether the Supreme Court ex-
tended the discretionary function exception to negligent
inspection in Varig. t53 The sources of confusion were the
Court's initial finding that both the Varig and United Scot-
,48 104 S. Ct. at 2767 (reviewing spot-check system). See FEDERAL AVIATION AD-
MINISTRATION FAA ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION at 31-32 (reprint 1967) (discuss-
ing spot-check procedures and criteria).
149 104 S. Ct. at 2767. The Court found that inspectors took "risks" during
inspection that were pursuant to a statutory grant of authority. Id. But see FED-
ERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION FAA ORDER TYPE CERTIFICATION, at 32 (reprint
1967) (suggesting limited discretion available to engineer but not to inspector).
104 S. Ct. at 2768.
Id. (finding that the Federal Aviation Administration exercises basic type of
discretion when it determines extent to which it supervises safety procedures of
private individuals).
1-' Id. at 2769. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to allow
liability for regulatory enforcement activities. Id.
1-5 See generally Hatfield, View from Justice, supra note 14, at 5-7 (arguing that Varig
extends discretionary function exception to negligent certification). See also Natu-
ral Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 502, 509 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding
that Varig extends discretionary function exception to negligent inspection); Proc-
tor v. United States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 3, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1984)
(finding Varig extended discretionary function exception to operational
negligence).
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tish cases were based on decisions not to inspect, and the
language of the decision that strongly suggested that the
Court was extending the discretionary function exception
to negligent inspection. 54 USIC petitioned the Supreme
Court for a rehearing, claiming that the Court misinter-
preted the facts of United Scottish.155 In its petition, United
Scottish predicted that the Court's initial decision would
result in confusion about the discretionary function
exception. 56
The insurance company first argued that the Court
erred in treating its case as a claim based on a negligent
decision not to inspect, rather than an actual negligent in-
spection.' 57 In support of this assertion, USIC cited the
district court's finding that an inspection of the heater was
required by FAA regulations and that such an inspection
had actually been made by the FAA.' 58  The insurance
company contended that, since the inspection was
mandatory, it was not a discretionary act.' 59 USIC also ar-
1- 104 S. Ct. at 2767-78 (1984). See supra note 34 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Court's finding that cases did not involve negligent inspection and lan-
guage indicating that Court extended discretionary function exception to
negligent inspection).
,55 Petition for Rehearing at 2, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755
(1984) (arguing that heater was actually inspected).
-6 Id. USIC argued that the Court needed to clarify its opinion in order to
provide guidance to government agencies and the private bar. Id. at 5.
, Id. USIC did not contend that the Administrator of the FAA or any other
person within the FAA who was embued with discretion abused authority or mis-
applied discretion. Id. at 2. Rather, USIC argued that an inspector at the opera-
tional level negligently carried out the duties mandated by the FAA
Administrator. Id.
1" Id. at 2-3. See supra note 77 (discussing district court finding that FAA actu-
ally inspected modification of DeHavilland Dove). By regulation, the FAA has not
made the applicant for a supplemental type certificate responsible for conducting
all inspections and tests necessary to determine that the aircraft conforms with
FAA airworthiness requirements, but instead has taken that responsibility upon
itself. 14 C.F.R. pt. 21E (1984). USIC concluded that the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Varig was incorrect in stating that the process to determine whether to
grant a supplemental type certificate is the same as that used for type certification.
Petition for Rehearing at 10, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755
(1984).
159 Petition for Rehearing at 9, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755
(1984). USIC argued that there was no room for discretion for the inspector be-
cause federal regulations specified the materials which could be used for the heat-
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gued that Dalehite did not apply to its case because United
Scottish concerned negligence at the operational level
rather than at the planning level.' 60
Relying on Indian Towing, United Scottish concluded
that negligent certification where inspection is mandatory
should lead to United States liability. 16' The insurance
company premised this conclusion on the assertion that
the inspector who negligently checked the heater had no
discretion to negligently perform his duties, and that the
discretionary function exception protects only acts or
omissions where the government exercises statutorily
granted discretion. 162 The Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition for a rehearing without issuing an opinion. 63
B. Critical Analysis of Varig
In Varig, the Court extended the limited legislative his-
tory of the FTCA and the Act's discretionary function ex-
ception and implied that Congress intended to protect all
negligence of regulatory agencies from suit by private
parties.' 6 4 The Court did not adequately consider legisla-
tive history indicating Congress' desire to limit the dis-
cretionary function exception to protection of policy level
decisions of regulatory agencies. 165 In addition, the
ing line, the routing that was required, the vibration excursion which was
permissible, and the type of clamping that was mandatory. Id.
wo) Id. at 6-8. USIC emphasized that the district court found that the heater was
inspected. Id.
,,; Id. at 6. USIC stated, however, that the inspection decisions of the Adminis-
trator and lower level FAA employees are protected by the discretionary function
exception, and that Varig was correctly decided on its facts. Id. at 8.
162 Id. at 5. The government conceded that the discretionary function excep-
tion was not applicable to the facts of United Scottish in the district court. United
Scottish Ins. Co., No. CV 71-36E, slip op. at 9. The government stated that
"[n]owhere on appeal has the United States argued that the discretionary function
exception applies in the instant action." Reply Brief for the United States at 3,
Varig Airlines v. United States, 614 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1979).
"' United States v. United Scottish Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 26 (1984).
104 S. Ct. at 2767. The Court concluded from the legislative history that the
FAA has a statutory duty to promote safety in air transportation, but that it does
not have a duty to ensure safety. Id. at 2768.
" See, HEARINGS ON H.R. 5373 AND H.R. 6463 BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITrEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 28, 33 (1942) (statement of Assistant At-
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Court's analysis of Dalehite and its progeny failed to con-
sider the planning/operation distinction, which was im-
portant to the application of the discretionary function
exception.1 66
In reviewing Dalehite, the Court quoted one excerpt
from that case that states that acts of subordinates in car-
rying out official directions fall within the discretionary
function exception.1 67 The Court did not, however, refer
to these subordinates as administrators, as the Court did
in Dalehite.'68  Because the Court does not discuss the
holding of Dalehite and only presents this one quote, it
seems that the Court views the quoted section as the pri-
mary rationale of Dalehite.t69 The excerpt from Dalehite,
taken out of context, does suggest a very broad applica-
tion of the discretionary function exception. 7 0  The
Court, however, neglected to consider the emphasis that
it previously placed in Dalehite on establishing and high-
lighting the occurence of negligence at the planning
stage, rather than at the operational stage.17' In addition,
the Court failed to discuss the definition of discretionary
acts of subordinates provided in Dalehite: "determinations
torney General Francis M. Shea) (stating that common law torts of employees of
regulatory agencies would be included within the scope of the bill). See, also H. R.
7263, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 303(7), 84 CONG. REC. 1,492 (1939) (providing that
waiver of soverign immunity should not extend to any claim for damages caused
by implementation of laws by the Federal Trade Commission or Securities and
Exchange Commission).
16 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 40-42 (1953) (developing founda-
tion of planning/operation distinction).
167 Id.
168 Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2763-64 (1984). See supra note 132 (discussing Court's
quotation from Dalehite).
,I, Id. 2762. Immediately after quoting this section of Dalehite, the Court stated
that "the respondents insist that the view of § 2680(a) expressed in Dalehite has
been eroded." Id. This statement indicates that the Court in Varig construed this
quote as the rationale of Dalehite. Id. at 2769.
170 Id. at 2764. Courts have construed Dalehite as extending the discretionary
function exception to all negligent acts of regulatory agencies as well as limiting
the discretionary function exception to negligent acts on the policy making level.
See Tompkins, Negligent Certification, supra note 9, at 587 (discussing difficulties in
application of Dalehite).
171 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 42 (1953) (tracing accident back to
Cabinet level plan).
made by executives or administrators in establishing
plans, specifications, or schedules of operation are discre-
tionary acts.' 7 2 This definition presents a far narrower
view of the scope of the discretionary function exception
than does the earlier text quoted and relied on in Varig.'73
Chief Justice Burger's omission of the planning-opera-
tion distinction in Varig is particularly surprising consider-
ing that the test has been applied in FTCA cases for thirty
years. 74  The Court ignored the planning/operational
principle articulated in Indian Towing and Eastern Airlines,
which did not apply the discretionary function exception
where the negligent operational level employee simply
followed a direction from superiors.175 The significant in-
quiry under the planning/operation standard developed
in Dalehite, Indian Towing, and Eastern Airlines is whether
the negligent government employee exercised statutorily
granted discretion or merely personal discretion. 76 If the
employee exercised statutorily granted discretion, the dis-
cretionary function exception applied, but if the employee
used personal discretion, then the discretionary function
exception would not protect the negligent act.
177
The Supreme Court also failed to distinguish the facts
,72 Id. at 34 (discussing legislative history).
,7. See Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160, 1168 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (dis-
cussing broad and narrow constructions of discretionary function exception in
Dalehite).
174 See Petition for Rehearing at 7-8, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct.
2755 (1984) (aruging that planning/operation distinction should be applied in
United Scottish). See also supra note 29 (discussing cases employing planning-opera-
tional distinction).
,7.1 See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 34 (1953) (developing plan-
ning/operation distinction). See also Petition for Rehearing at 6, United States v.
Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (arguing that Court ignored operational as-
pect of negligence).
17.. See Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 77-78 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam) (noting that there was some individual discretion involved in activi-
ties of air traffic controllers but that discretion was not at policy-making level),
afd sub nom. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955).
177 See, e.g., Indian Towing v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 65-67 (1955) (estab-
lishing standards for planning/operation distinction). See generally, Tompkins, Neg-
ligent Certification, supra note 9, at 594 (discussing planning/operation distinction).
In United Scottish, the discretionary function exception should not have been ap-
plied because the inspector did not have statutorily granted discretion to inspect
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of Varig from those of United Scottish.'7 s The Court's find-
ing that both Varig and United Scottish involved claims for
negligent decisions not to inspect and the broad language
of the opinion, established confusing precedent. 179 Leav-
ing this problem unrectified, the Court denied USIC's pe-
tition for a rehearing.18 0
In addition to the Court's failure to distinguish between
the facts of Varig and those of Scottish, the Court neglected
to distinguish the type certification process in Vang from
the supplemental type certification process in United Scot-
tish. ' The Court did not discuss both the finding of the
district court in United Scottish that the heater was in-
spected and the concession by the government that in-
spection in these circumstances was mandatory.18 2 The
government would have been held liable in United Scottish
if the Court had determined that a mandatory inspection
duty existed. 8 3 There is considerable case law that holds
the United States liable for the failure of its employees to
carry out a mandatory inspection. 8 4
VI: THE IMPLICATIONS OF VARIG
The broadly worded decision in Vanig, read in conjunc-
the aircraft. See petition for Rehearing at 4-7, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104
S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
,78 Petition for Rehearing at 3-6, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755
(1984) (arguing that Supreme Court misconstrued facts of the case).
179 Id. at 2. See infra notes 185-187 (confusion that still exists regarding the dis-
cretionary function exception following the Supreme Court's decision in Varig).
,80 United States v. United Scottish Ins. Co., 105 S. Ct. 26 (1984).
18, See Petition for Rehearing at 8-10, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct.
2755 (1984) (arguing that Court failed to note the performance of a mandatory
inspection in United Scottish).
182 See Brief for the United States, United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, No.
CV No. 71-36E, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 1980) (stating that inspection of heater
was required under FAA regulations).
183 See supra note 48 and accompanying text (noting that courts have held U.S.
liable for failing to perform act required by statute).
184 Id. See also Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871,
875 (10th Cir. 1984);Jayure Brand, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 385, 389 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); Hylin v. United States, 715 F.2d 1206, 1213 (7th Cir. 1983); Bergman
v. United States, 689 F.2d 789, 792 (8th Cir. 1982); Reminga v. United States, 631
F.2d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 1980).
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tion with the Court's denial of USIC's petition for a re-
hearing, may have significantly narrowed the scope of
government liability under the FTCA.t8 5 The decision in-
dicates that the discretionary function exception will pro-
tect not only the acts of the government policy maker, but
also the acts of individuals who carry out those policies at
the operational level.' 86  The decision of the Supreme
Cout in Varig suggests that federal regulatory agencies
monitoring compliance of private industries with federal
regulations will be fully protected from liability.187 The
broadly worded decision of the Court in Varig will signifi-
1" See Petition for Rehearing at 5, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct.
2755 (1984). See also Hatfield, View from Justice, supra note 14, at 4 (arguing that
ambiguity in Varig meant that Court extended discretionary function exception to
negligent inspections). See also Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d
502, 509 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that Varig extends discretionary function excep-
tion to negligent inspection); Proctor v. United States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at
3, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 1984) (finding Varig extended discretionary function excep-
tion to operational negligence).
186 See Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765-68 (implying that discretionary function excep-
tion generally extends to negligence of all regulatory agency employees).
"87 See Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2765 (finding that Congress intended to exempt the
U.S. from liability where it regulates the conduct of private individuals). A review
of the regulatory activities of government agencies reveals a wide range of inspec-
tion and certification activities. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982) (Farmers Home
Administration inspects homes built with financial assistance provided by the
agency); 7 U.S.C. § 77 (1982) (Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspects and
certifies grain shipped from the U.S. abroad); 21 U.S.C. § 455 (1982) (USDA in-
spects poultry products); 21 U.S.C. § 603 (1982) (USDA inspects cattle, sheep,
swine, goats, horses, and mules before slaughtering, packing, or meat canning); 7
U.S.C. § 150(f) (1982) (USDA inspects for plant pests on articles transported into
the U.S.); 21 U.S.C. § 693 (1982) (USDA inspects and certifies dairy products in-
tended for export); 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1982) (Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) inspects premises where an effluent source is located); 15 U.S.C. § 2610
(1982) (EPA inspects premises where work with chemical substances is per-
formed); 42 U.S.C. § 6927 (1982) (EPA inspects hazardous waste facilities); 7
U.S.C. § 136 (g) (1982) (EPA inspects establishments where pesticides are distrib-
uted or sold); 45 U.S.C. § 23 (1982) (Department of Transportation (DoT) in-
spects locomotives); 46 U.S.C. § 39 (1982) (Coast Guard inspects and certifies
biannually the hull and equipment of cargo barges over 100 tons); 15 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (1982) (DoT inspects facilities manufacturing automobiles); 49 U.S.C.
§ 1680 (1982) (DoT inspects pipeline facilities); 33 U.S.C. § 467 (1982) (Depart-
ment of the Army inspects dams); 38 U.S.C. § 642 (1982) (Veterans Administra-
tion inspects state nursing homes); 18 U.S.C. § 923(g) (1982) (Department of
Treasury inspects firearms or ammunition kept by importers, manufacturers,
dealers and collectors); 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (1982) (Consumer Product Safety Com-
mission inspects establishments manufacturing, holding, or transporting con-
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catnly restrict recovery by plaintiffs in negligence actions
against federal regulatory agencies. 88 Many federal agen-
cies have inspection and certification authority similar to
that of the FAA, and virtually every business that engages
in interstate commerce is subject to some form of federal
certification and licensing.1 89 For example, the holding in
Varig may extend to the Food and Drug Administration's
inspection and certification of the safety of food and
drugs, 190 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's in-
spection of the financial records of federally insured
banks,' 9' the Occupational Safety and Health Administra-
tion's inspection of the safety and health conditions of
most work places,' 9 2 and the Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministration's inspection of the safety and health condi-
tions of mines.1 9 3
sumer products in commerce); and 42 U.S.C. § 5413 (1982) (Department of
Housing and Urban Development inspects the construction of new homes).
"I" See, e.g., Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, 742 F.2d 502, 504 (9th
Cir. 1984) (finding that Varig extended the discretionary function exception to
entire certification process including negligent inspection); Proctor v. United
States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 1984) (finding that Varig
extended the discretionary function exception to negligent certification). See also
Dombroff, The High Court's Varig Decision Defines Limits of Federal Liability, NAT'L L.J.
Jul. 16, 1984, at 20 [hereinafter cited as Dombroff, High Court Decision] (arguing
that Varig developed definite parameters of government liability).
119 Brief for the United States at 26, United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct.
2755 (1984) (discussing breadth of federal certification and regulation). See supra
note 187 (reviewing variety of areas that U.S. government regulates and
certificates).
11 See, e.g., Anglo-American & Overseas Corp. v. United States, 144 F. Supp.
635 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (holding government liable for negligent certification and
inspection of tomato paste imported from overseas), afd, 242 F.2d 236 (2d Cir.
1957). The Food and Drug Administration inspects and certificates pursuant to
21 U.S.C. § 374 (1982).
- See, e.g., First State Bank v. United States, 599 F.2d 558 (3d Cir. 1979) (hold-
ing U.S. liable for failure of Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to notify bank
of improprieties discovered during inspection), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1013 (1980).
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation inspects financial records pursuant to
12 U.S.C. § 1820(b) (1982).
"92 See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 536 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding U.S.
liable for failure of Occupational Safety and Health Administration inspector to
discover and warn about defective trench). The Occupational Safety and Health
Administration inspects and certificates pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 657 (1982).
,91 See, e.g., Raymer v. United States, 660 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding
U.S. not liable for alleged negligence of mine inspectors for failure to discover
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The Varig decison will have a significant impact on the
case law dealing with governmental liability for negligent
inspection and certification. 94 The Court's reinterpreta-
tion of Dalehite as establishing the principle that the acts of
all subordinates in exercising a discretionary program
should fall within the discretionary function exception,
will provide a distinct advantage to the government in
FTCA litigation.'9 5 This broad interpretation of Dalehite,
read in conjunction with the Court's virtual dismissal of
Indian Towing and Eastern Airlines as irrelevant, may be
viewed as an abandonment of the planning/operation dis-
tinction.' 96  The Court's failure to discuss the plan-
ning/operation distinction may also be read as its
abandoment of those cases that developed the distinction.
After Varig, lower federal courts will have to speculate on
whether the Court extended the discretionary function
exception to operational inspections. 97 In denying the
petition for rehearing, the Court missed an opportunity to
clarify an area of law muddled with inconsistent
decisions. 198
and cite a danger), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982). The Mine Safety Health Ad-
ministration inspects and certificates pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 813 (1982).
,,14 See generally Dombroff, High Court Decision, supra note 16 at 20 (suggesting
that yarig may extend discretionary function exception to negligence of other fed-
eral agencies).
195 See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
- See Varig, 104 S. Ct. at 2764 (finding that Indian Towing and Eastern Airlines did
not affect the Dalehite decision). The Court seems to have replaced the plan-
ning/operation distinction with a regulatory/nonregulatory distinction. Id. at
2765.
197 See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
198 There exists a need to clarify the discretionary function exception because
lower court decisions after Dalehite do not comprise a particularly coherent body
of case law. See United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2766 (1984) (ac-
knowledging inconsistencies in prior FTCA caselaw). Compare Ashley v. United
States, 215 F. Supp. 39, 45-46 (D. Neb. 1963) (finding field decision on how to
handle troublesome bear in national park protected by discretionary function ex-
ception), aff'd, 326 F.2d 499 (8th Cir. 1964), and Miller v. United States, 410 F.
Supp. 425 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (finding negligent operation of waterworks protected
by discretionary function exception) with Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990,
995 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding decision of FBI on how to handle aircraft hijacking
not protected by discretionary function exception) and Ingham v. Eastern Airlines,
Inc., 373 F.2d 227, 230 (2d Cir.) (finding negligent operation of airport control
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A. Recent Cases
In the first FTCA action following Varig, Proctor v. United
States,199 a district court, found that the Varig decision ex-
tended the discretionary function exception to negligent
inspection at the operational level and consequently dis-
missed the case against the government.0 0 In Proctor, 301
persons were killed in a fire on a Lockheed L-10 11 in Ri-
yadh, Saudi Arabia.2 0 ' The plaintiffs, the subrogees of
Saudi Arabian Airlines, were paid a total of $52 million in
settlement of claims, and alleged that the FAA negligently
inspected the aircraft leading to the issuance of a faulty
type certificate and the resulting accident.20 2 The district
court highlighted the Varig decision's emphasis on the
policy of applying the discretionary function exception to
the acts of regulatory agencies, regardless of whether the
acts occur at the planning or operational level.203 The
tower not protected by discretionary function exception), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 931
(1967).
No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 2-4 (finding discretionary function exception
extends to negligent inspection of aircraft).
200 Id. at 4-6. The court in Proctor, in addition to relying on Varig, noted that
holding the government liable for negligent inspection would render the FAA im-
mune from liability under Varig if it certified an aircraft without an inspection, but
subject to liability if it certified an aircraft after an inspection. Id. at 5-6. The
court suggested that this would tend to encourage the FAA to inspect as few air-
craft as possible and would be contrary to the FAA's statutory duty to promote
safety in air transportation. Id. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Washington found in Mitchell v. United States, however, that the plan-
ning/operation distinction was still the applicable test for application of the dis-
cretionary function exception. Mitchell v. United States, No. C-82-880 (E.D.
Wash. Nov. 30, 1984) (order denying motions for summary judgment and dismis-
sal). See also Olsen By Sheldon v. Government of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 647 (9th
Cir. 1984) (decisions made at operational level are not within discretionary func-
tion exception, even though such decisions may involve elements of discretion);
Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978, 980 (9th Cir. 1982) (considering ability
of courts to evaluate actor omission of agency in application of discretionary func-
tion exception); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir. 1975) (con-
sidering whether judicial administration would impair the effectiveness of the
government).
20, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 1.
202 Id.
20 Id. at 3-6. The court in Proctor relied on the Supreme Court's emphasis on
the policy that a regulatory agency should not be held liable for negligent acts. Id.
at 5.
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district court dismissed the action against the govern-
ment, finding that Varig was controlling. 204 The court
stated that "it is clear that the Court [in Varig] adopted the
much broader position urged by the government; that is,
that the entire FAA certification process is immune from
potential tort liability. 20 5
In Natural Gas Pipeline Co. v. United States, °6 the Ninth
Circuit found that Varig controlled a case arising out of a
negligent inspection of two Rockwell business jets.207
The plaintiffs in Natural Gas Pipeline alleged that the FAA
was negligent in issuing the supplemental type certificate
and in failing to promptly ground the defective aircraft.20 8
The court in Natural Gas Pipeline suggested that after Varig,
the entire system of reviewing compliance with federal
regulation is protected by the discretionary function
exception.20 9
The decisions in Varig, Proctor and Natural Gas Pipeline
may also apply to actions for negligent inspection and cer-
tification against other government agencies that monitor
private industries' compliance with federal regulations.21 0
For example, the government used Vanig to argue for ap-
plication of the discretionary function exception to General
Public Utilities Corp. v. United States .2 1 In General Public Utili-
I- ld. at 6. See also Seagram and Sons, Inc. v. United States, No. 83-900-C, slip
op. at 13 (S.D. Ind.Jan. 9, 1985) (finding that FAA certification process is immune
from potential tort liability).
•2o ld. at 4.
2- 742 F.2d 502, 504 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding discretionary function exception
applies to negligent inspection for supplemental type certificate). In National Gas
Pipeline, the FAA monitored and inspected the modification of two Rockwell busi-
ness jets. Id. at 503.
207 Id. The court found that the facts of National Gas Pipeline were similar to
those in Varig. Id.
208 Id. at 504.
2 Id. at 504-05. The court, in dismissing the case, cited the holding in Varig
which states that "the FAA's implementation of a mechanism for compliance re-
view is plainly discretionary activity .. " Id. (quoting United States v. Varig
Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755, 2768 (1984)).
210 See generally, Dombroff, High Court Decision, supra note 16, at 18 (asserting that
Varig may affect government tort liability in variety of government regulatory
agencies).
21, 551 F. Supp. 521, 523 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding negligent failure of the Nu-
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ties, the plaintiffs alleged that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission negligently failed to inform General Public
of a hazardous operating defect in its nuclear generating
facility at Three Mile Island, in violation of a statutory
duty.21 2 The district court in General Public Utilities relied
on, the planning/operation distinction, which the Court
impliedly eliminated in Varig. 213  The Third Circuit re-
versed on appeal, finding Varig controlling. 21 4
Varig may also control the appeal of Allen v. United
States.21 5 In Allen, residents who lived downwind from a
Nevada nuclear atmospheric testing site developed cancer
and sued the government, alleging that their illnesses re-
sulted from the government's failure to inform them of
how to avoid or minimize known dangers.216 The United
States District Court for the District of Utah found that
clear Regulatory Commission to inform plantiff of Three Mile Island defect not
protected by discretionary function exception), aft'd, 745 F.2d 239, 242 (3rd Cir.
1984). In General Public Utilities, the Three Mile Island Unit No. 2 nuclear generat-
ing facility experienced a near "melt-down" of its main core as a result of the
malfunctioning of its cooling system. Id. at 522. As a result, radioactive material
from the damaged core leaked from the building and exposed nearby residents to
radiation, causing catastrophic damages which the plaintiffs claim exceed $4 bil-
lion. Id. The plaintiffs allege that the NRC failed to disseminate information on a
similar, but less severe, accident that occurred at the Davis-Besse nuclear genera-
tion station, produced by the same manufacturer as the facility at Three Mile Is-
land. Id. at 523. The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss,
finding that the action against the United States was not barred by the discretion-
ary function exception. Id. at 531. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed, finding Vang controlling. General Public Utilities Corp. v. United
States, 745 F.2d 239, 242 (3rd Cir. 1984).
2 2 Id. at 523-24. The plaintiffs asserted that the NRC breached its self-imposed
duties to warn of design defects, pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 1.64, which requires the
NRC to inform reactor operators of new safety developments. Id. at 523.
21 Id. at 531. The court in General Public Utilities considered the amount of dis-
cretion available to the NRC scientists. Id. The court reviewed the exactness of
the standards guiding the scientists and concluded that the scientists did not have
the policy level discretion required by the planning/operation distinction in
Dalehite . Id. See also Feres v. United States, No. 83-1402, Slip op. at 15 (6th Cir.
Dec. 12, 1984) (finding Varig controlling regarding United States' failure to pro-
vide Chrysler employees with safety training).
214 General Public Utilities, 745 F.2d at 242.
2 5 588 F. Supp. 247, 248 (D. Utah 1984) (finding that discretionary function
exception does not protect negligent failure of government to warn of nuclear
danger).
216 Id. at 257.
the discretionary function exception did not protect the
government's negligence in its 1950's atmospheric nu-
clear testing program.217
The Varig decision was clarified and distinguished in
McMichael v. United States218 in which plaintiffs sought re-
course for deaths and injuries caused by an explosion at
the government supervised Celesco munitions plant near
Camden, Arkansas. 21 9 In McMichael, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court's order denying the United
States' motion to dismiss the complaints.220 The Eighth
Circuit, in distinguishing Varig, emphasized that Varig con-
cerned regulatory government functions and that McMi-
chael involved the Defense Department as a proprietor.22 '
The court in McMichael also emphasized that, while Varig
involved an optional inspection, McMichael involved
mandatory inspections by on-site government inspec-
tors.222 The court also noted that the government inspec-
tors in McMichael had primary responsibility for
inspection, and that private industry was the primary in-
spector in Varig.2 s
B. Varig: Policy Analysis
If the United States were held liable for policy-level de-
cisions regarding the spot-check system, it might become
217 Id. at 3710. The court found that the government's failure to monitor the
effects of fallout on the nearby population and warn them of the dangers did not
fall within the ambit of the discretionary function exception. Id.
218 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985) (affirming district court order denying United
States motion to dismiss).
219 Id. at 304. The plaintiffs alleged that the government was negligent in (1)
awarding a contract to produce a highly dangerous commodity to Celesco, which
did not possess the necessary skills or facilities to fulfill the contract; (2) promul-
gating inadequate safety standards; and (3) failing to enforce Celesco's compli-
ance with safety requirements set forth in the manual. Id.
220 Id. at 305, affirming McMichael v. Bartlett, 521 F.Supp. 1273 (W.D. Ark.
1981).
221 Id. at 306.
222 Id. at 307. The court in McMichael emphasized that the inspectors were not
in a position to make discretionary spot-checks, but rather had a number of pre-
cise inspections to perform that involved no judgment or agency policy. Id.
223 Id.
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an insurer of the conduct of private parties.224 The Gov-
ernment would need to significantly increase the strength
of its enforcement apparatus if it were an insurer of pri-
vate conduct. 225 A decision such as this, by virtue of the
financial commitment involved, should be made by Con-
gress and not by the courts. Victims of aircraft accidents
and their families will also continue to be fully compen-
sated for damages after Varig.2 6  The Varig decision
merely shifts liability from the United States to the manu-
facturers and aircraft operators.22 7 Finally, a policy that
holds the United States liable for negligent inspection
would lead to the anomaly of holding the United States
liable where it attempts to enforce government regula-
tions and shielding it from liability when it decides not to
inspect at all. 228 This result may create a disincentive for
the United States to strengthen its enforcement efforts.
Courts interpreting Varig, however, should distinguish be-
tween situations where the United States has a secondary
role in enforcement and where it has the primary role for
enforcement or operation. 2 9
224 See United States v. Varig Airlines, 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984) (finding that ex-
tending discretionary function exception to spot-check system would make U.S.
insurer of private industry); see Hatfield, The Non-Liability of the Government for Certi-
fication of Aircraft, supra note 128 at 607 (arguing that allowing recovery for negli-
gent certification would make U.S. an insurer of air travel); see generally Dombroff,
High Court Decision, supra note 16, at 20 (discussing Varig's development of definite
parameters of governmental immunity).
225 See Interview with James S. Dillman, Assistant Chief Counsel for Litigation,
Federal Aviation Administration, Washington, D.C. (March 15, 1985).
226 Id. In aviation tort cases, the total amount of damages is usually estimated
and established prior to final dispostion of case. Id. Varig will place the higher
percentage of fault on the noncarriers and operators at settlement, but it will not
reduce the total damages recovered. Id.
227 Id.
228 See Proctor v. United States, No. CV 83-3415, slip op. at 2-4 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
22, 1984) (finding discretionary function exception extends to negligent inspec-
tion of aircraft).
229 See McMichael, 588 F.2d at 304 (affirming district court order denying motion
of United States to dismiss, thus suggesting that United States should be held
liable where it has primary role in enforcement of contract).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In United States v. Varig Airlines,23 ° the Supreme Court
extended the protection of the discretionary function ex-
ception to "operational" governmental activities, such as
those where an employee merely carries out a decision
made by a superior. Prior caselaw, developed since the
mid-1950's, imposed liability on the government for such
negligent operational activities. Those cases imposed lia-
bility for government negligence where employees carried
out orders in a negligent manner and shielded the gov-
ernment from liability where employees exercised discre-
tion at the policy making level.
Varig places the entire FAA certification and inspection
process under the protection of the discretionary function
exception. The implications of Varig are broad and signif-
icant. Under the decision, any regulatory agency that
monitors private industries' compliance with federal regu-
lations may be immune from liability under the FTCA.
Varig is a weak decision because of its inadequate treat-
ment of prior caselaw, its failure to correctly note the facts
and federal regulations applicable to the joined case,
United Scottish, and its excessively broad scope. The Varig
decision sets unclear precedent and it will require federal
courts to speculate regarding the treatment of the discre-
tionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act.
2. 104 S. Ct. 2755 (1984).
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